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Selling ‘Alternatives to 
Prison’ to Judicial Consumers: 
Why the Market Logic Fails
Cyrus Tata, University of Strathclyde,  proposes that 
market-based thinking embeds prison as the default 
sentence.
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How should prison sentencing in relatively less 
serious cases be reduced? Generations of reform-
minded government officials, probation managers, 
academics and practitioners have tried to reduce 
the use of prison in relatively less serious cases. 
Yet these efforts to sell community penalties 
have not resulted in the desired radical reduction 
in the use of imprisonment. Indeed, as a society 
we seem to be using prison more than ever – even 
for those whose offending in itself does not 
demand it.
Judicial sentencers, we are told, would use these 
‘alternatives’ if only they could be persuaded 
to have ‘confidence’ in them. The solution? 
Pre-Sentence Reports  ‘provide an invaluable 
mechanism via which influence can be exerted 
over sentencing’ (Taylor, Clarke and McArt 2014: 
53). By ‘selling’ community penalties more 
effectively, judicial sentencers will choose to ‘buy’ 
them in the case they are about to sentence and 
as a concept more generally.
So instead of an open debate about penal 
reform and sentencing policy, ‘alternatives’ to 
prison have to be ‘sold’ convincingly to individual 
judicial sentencers on a case-by-case basis. 
Yet, while PSRs (and their various precursors) 
are important in various ways to sentencing, 
this strategy of ‘selling alternatives’ to judicial 
‘consumers’ has failed to achieve radical change 
(Tata 2018). Surprisingly, many still cling to the 
claim that the impact of reports can be seen in 
the rate of ‘agreement’ between the sentencing 
suggestions in reports and the sentence 
passed. This is muddled thinking. As Carter 
and Wilkins (1967: 508) pointed out some 50 
years ago: ‘Probation officers write their reports 
and make recommendations anticipating the 
recommendation the court desires to receive’ .
Propelling this logic, which holds the cultural 
trope of the singular sovereign judicial 
sentencer’s choice as paramount, is a consumerist 
logic of the market. So it is that so much practice 
and policy effort goes into trying to discover 
what the judicial consumer ‘really wants’. What 
do judges look for? How can reports be more 
appealing to judicial sentencers? How can reports 
satisfy their key consumers to persuade them to 
buy the proposed product? 
Instead, I propose that we step back from the 
dominant metaphors of selling and buying 
sentencing options. What assumptions inhere 
in this market-based logic? I suggest that this 
market-based strategy is bound to fail. The 
seller-buyer logic which inheres in consumerism 
necessitates a failure to satisfy the consumer. In 
his penetrating analysis of the consumer society,  
Bauman (2007: 46-7) explains that consumer 
needs and wants must remain, at most, only 
partly fulfilled: 
“the desire remains ungratified, more 
importantly as long as the client is not 
completely satisfied … . Consumer society 
thrives as long as it manages to render 
the non-satisfaction of its members (and, 
so in its own terms, their unhappiness) 
perpetual.” 
Let us consider three examples which are central 
to ‘selling alternatives’ to prison.
1. Realism, credibility and the 
consumer
A key criticism frequently levelled against PSRs 
and their earlier guises is that they often lack 
‘credibility’ and are ‘unrealistic’. If, for instance, 
the suggested proposed sentence is in the eyes 
of the sentencers ‘unrealistic’ then the credibility 
of the whole report is undermined: ‘“It diminishes 
the validity and the value of the report, if you’re 
getting such an unrealistic suggestion”’ (judge, 
Tata et al. 2008).
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However, the ability to apprehend what a 
‘realistic’ sentence would be is undermined both 
by a lack of transparent sentencing information 
in similar cases and, second, by an awareness of 
inter-judge sentencing disparity: what may be 
realistic to one judge may not be to another.  
2. Relevance
In the consumption of reports, there is a paradox.  
Judicial consumers often complain, sometimes 
almost simultaneously, about reports being ‘long-
winded’ and also about abbreviated reports being 
too brief with ‘too many ticky boxes’ (Tata 2018). 
Indeed, this apparent contradiction in consumer 
demand is played out in the restless oscillation 
over time between a preference for full, as 
opposed to abbreviated, reports (for example, 
Standard versus Fast delivery PSRs). 
How can we make sense of this apparent 
contradiction in consumer demand: wanting yet 
not wanting ‘comprehensive’ information about 
the individual? The answer lies partly in the 
consumer cynicism which perpetual product re-
branding generates.
3. Novelty and Perpetual Re-
branding
Why are community penalties the subject of 
incessant re-branding? The perpetual search 
for new community penalty ‘products’ and ways 
of selling them (PSRs) so as to persuade the 
consumer to buy them is inherent in consumerism. 
Bauman explains: 
“New needs need new commodities; new 
commodities need new needs and desires; 
the advent of consumerism augurs the era 
of ‘inbuilt obsolescence’ of goods offered 
on the market and signals a spectacular 
rise in the waste-disposal industry.”  
(Bauman 2007: 31)
Governments tend to respond to judicial-
consumer complaints about the quality of 
PSRs by marshalling the bureaucratic values 
of standardisation and speed. Yet, this can also 
result in consumer disappointment. Report-
writing templates, now being heavily used in 
England and Wales (Robinson 2017, 2018), 
may quickly come to be seen as copy and paste, 
tick boxes products, engendering consumer 
cynicism.  Product novelty is also sought in ‘new 
alternatives’ to custody, which weary judicial 
consumers may understandably dismiss as 
another over-hyped passing fad. 
Selling Alternatives’ embeds prison 
as the default
Conceiving of the judge as the metaphorical 
sovereign consumer in a quasi-market-place 
appears to empower the judge: the customer 
is always right; the customer is king. The job of 
the seller is to persuade the consumer to buy 
her/his goods, while the consumer can simply 
buy elsewhere: notably prison. This consumerist 
conceptualisation takes for granted and embeds 
the idea that the judicial sentencer is minded 
towards prison as the obvious default if nothing 
else can prove itself. 
SELLING ‘ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON’ TO JUDICIAL CONSUMERS: WHY THE MARKET LOGIC FAILS
41
PROBATION QUARTERLY  ISSUE 11
Making prison ‘the last resort’ may sound 
progressive, but it simply solidifies it as the 
backstop if nothing else seems good enough. It 
cements the supposition that unless, and until 
‘alternatives’ can be sold as credible, prison is 
the only realistic option. If nothing else is sold 
convincingly to the sentencer, then it will be 
prison. Unlike ‘alternatives’, prison never has to 
prove itself to the sentencer. Prison is always 
assured. It does not have to be sold or marketed. 
It is the backstop, the default, which is always 
ready, dependable and available to the judge, 
reassuring in its familiarity. 
Positioning the judge as the consumer solidifies 
the idea, the trope, of him/her as the exclusive 
sovereign individual chooser: the decision 
belongs to the judge alone. Thus, the seller must 
meet the expectations of the consumer – not to 
do so risks being perceived as naïve or unrealistic. 
Challenging expectations and assumptions can be 
bad for business. 
An Alternative to ‘Selling 
Alternatives to Prison’
Rather than framing reports in sentencing in 
market terms of producer/seller and consumer, 
we could conceive of sentencing as a (multi-
disciplinary) partnership with the judge as head 
of the team, a relationship explicitly based on 
mutual professional respect, while, nonetheless, 
accepting that the judge takes the final decision. 
However, to mainstream this idea would require 
openly discussing the trope that sentencing 
belongs solely and exclusively to individual, 
sovereign judicial consumers operating in a penal 
market-place. 
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